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  753 
INMATES’ E-MAILS WITH THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
OFF-LIMITS FOR THE GOVERNMENT? 
Amelia H. Barry+ 
It is commonly understood that a conversation with one’s attorney is 
protected. 1   This attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest evidentiary 
privileges in the common law.2  It exists to incentivize lawyers and their clients 
to have forthcoming conversations, which furthers the truth-seeking function of 
the legal system.3 
The attorney-client privilege is especially important for inmates, who 
otherwise have very little power to communicate privately, free from 
government surveillance.4  An inmate’s right to speak privately with counsel 
during a legal proceeding is a “fundamental right.” 5   Therefore, when a 
                                                        
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2016, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 
2009, Hamilton College.  The author would like to thank Professor Cara H. Drinan for her 
invaluable edits.  The author would also like to thank her colleagues on the Catholic University 
Law Review for their work on this Comment. 
 1. See Gennusa v. Shoar, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (“[P]eople generally 
believe conversations with their attorneys will be kept privileged and confidential.”); see also 
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (citing 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961))  (“Confidential disclosures by a 
client to an attorney made in order to obtain legal assistance are privileged.”); Lance Cole, Revoking 
Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement’s Multi-Front Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege 
(And Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469, 474–75 (2003) (explaining that the attorney-
client privilege exists in both the federal jurisdiction and all state jurisdictions, and that it is rooted 
in the idea that the lawyer owes his client loyalty and cannot testify against his client). 
 2. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 
1); see also Cole, supra note 1, at 474 (describing the age of the history of the privilege). 
 3. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (“The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy 
serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully 
informed by the client.”); see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 
F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining that the attorney-client privilege furthers “the 
functioning of our legal system, by protecting the confidentiality of communications between 
clients and their attorneys”). 
 4. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525–26 (1984) (stating that inmates are not entitled 
to a “subjective expectation of privacy” in their prison cells); Laurie L. Levenson, LEVENSON ON 
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 5:76 (Thomson West 2014) (2011) (“[E]lectronic 
surveillance or eavesdropping does not make overheard statements of prisoners inadmissible.”); 1 
JAMES G. CARR & PATRICIA L. BELLIA, LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 3:6 (2015) (noting 
an inmate’s “diminished privacy expectation” while incarcerated); 72 C.J.S. Prisons § 57 (2014) 
(“[A] prisoner generally cannot expect to enjoy the same right to privacy that a person in free 
society does, and with the exception of limited circumstances involving a special relationship, an 
inmate has no reasonable expectation of privacy in jailhouse conversations.”); see also United 
States v. DeFonte, 441 F.3d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that although there is a diminished 
expectation of privacy for inmates, they still have the protection of the attorney-client privilege). 
 5. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 758–59 (D.C. Cir. 1951).  The Coplon court held: 
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conversation between an attorney and his client was overheard or intercepted, 
courts have found it necessary to vacate the judgment against the client.6 
However, recently, courts have determined that the privilege protects an 
inmate’s in-person, telephonic, or mail correspondence with his attorney, but not 
communications transmitted via e-mail. 7   E-mail is quickly replacing other 
forms of communication between inmates and attorneys because of its ease and 
efficiency.8  However, despite its growing use, e-mails do not receive the same 
                                                        
The sanctity of the constitutional right of an accused privately to consult with counsel is 
generally recognized and zealously enforced by state as well as federal courts.  The court 
said in Ex parte Rider: “The right of an accused, confined in jail or other place of 
detention pending a trial of the charge against him, to have an opportunity to consult 
freely with his counsel without any third person, whose presence is objectionable to the 
accused, being present to hear what passes between the accused and his counsel, is one 
of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the American criminal law—a right that no 
Legislature or court can ignore or violate.” 
Id. at 758 (citation omitted). 
 6. See id. at 759 (explaining that the defendant and his lawyer had a right not to have their 
phone call monitored by the prosecution and that even if they had ample opportunity to 
communicate via in-person communications, that would not “erase the blot of unconstitutionality 
from the act of intercepting other consultations”).  See also O’Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345, 
345–46 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Court vacated the petitioner’s conviction 
and remanded for a new trial where the government introduced evidence that had been obtained 
through eavesdropping on the petitioner and his attorney); Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26, 26–
29 (1966). 
 7. Stephanie Clifford, Prosecutors Are Reading Emails From Inmates to Lawyers, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/23/nyregion/us-is-reading-inmates-
email-sent-to-lawyers.html?_r=0.  See United States v. Walia, No. 14–CR–213, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 102246, at *47–50 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014) (holding that the petitioner-inmate’s e-mail 
connection with his attorney was not protected by the attorney-client privilege and that the myriad 
of alternative means of confidential communication weigh against e-mail as a fundamental right); 
United States v. Asaro, No. 14–Cr–26, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 
2014) (stating that an inmate’s e-mail increased access to the outside, but the lack of protected 
communication “d[id] not rise to the level of a Sixth Amendment violation”); see also F.T.C. v. 
Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294-CAP, 2012 WL 171621, at *5–6 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 
2012) (holding that the defendants waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to e-mail 
communications because the prison facility e-mail system required users to consent to monitoring 
and warned that communications with attorneys were not privileged). 
 8. Robert E. Crotty, Chapter 62: Litigation Management by Law Firms, in 4A COMMERCIAL 
LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS § 62:41 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d ed. 2014) 
(“Communication via e-mail avoids some of the limitations of telephonic communication and is 
increasingly becoming the standard method of communication between inside and outside 
counsel.”); Matthew A. Piekarski, Note, E-Mail Content’s Brush with the Reasonable Expectation 
of Privacy: The Warshak Decision, 47 U. LOUSIVILLE L. REV. 771, 771 (2009) (noting that changes 
in the communications world often begot “allegations that the government is violating its citizens’ 
Fourth Amendment rights,” and attributing these disputes to the government’s failure to adapt); 
Sean M. O’Brien, Note, Extending the Attorney-Client Privilege: Do Internet E-Mail 
Communications Warrant A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?, 4 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. 
ADVOC. 187, 187 (1999) (explaining e-mail users’ expectations of privacy). 
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protection as traditional attorney-client communication.9  To understand this 
inconsistency, it is necessary to analyze the attorney-client privilege’s general 
underpinnings. 
The attorney-client privilege exists to facilitate the open and free exchange of 
information between attorneys and their clients so that attorneys are able to 
provide the best legal advice possible.10  The privilege applies to instances when 
an attorney and his client intend their communication to be confidential.11  Every 
state recognizes an attorney-client privilege,12 and the federal judiciary includes 
the privilege in the Federal Rules of Evidence.13 
When applied to inmates, the attorney-client privilege has historically existed 
for three forms of communication: in-person visits, letters, and phone calls.14  
First, with regard to the privilege for in-person visits, inmates and their attorneys 
are entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy, even when interviews are 
conducted in a police interview room.15  Therefore, prisons must provide an 
adequate environment for a private conversation to take place.16 
                                                        
 9. See Walia, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *47–50; Asaro, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
97396, at *3–4; F.T.C., 2012 WL 171621, at *7–8. 
 10. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (explaining that a client has a privilege of 
“secrecy upon communications between client and attorney” to facilitate the “administration of 
justice”). 
 11. In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (stating that the attorney-client 
privilege only exists for communications that the parties intend to be confidential).  In United States 
v. Fisher, the court said that the privilege applies when, 
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to 
whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his 
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the 
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) 
without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an 
opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not 
(d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) 
claimed and (b) not waived by the client. 
United States v. Fisher, 692 F. Supp. 488, 491 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (citing United States v. United Shoe 
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358–59 (D. Mass. 1950)). 
 12. William P. Matthews, Comment, Encoded Confidences: Electronic Mail, the Internet, 
and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 273, 280 (1996) (noting that most 
codifications of the attorney-client privilege “offer[] the same protection the common law 
afforded”). 
 13. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 14. See Gennusa v. Shoar, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (dealing with visits); 
United States v. Korbe, 2:09-CR-05, 2010 WL 2776337, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 14, 2010) (regarding 
phone calls); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 902 (N.D. Fla. 1976) (covering mail 
communications). 
 15. Gennusa, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1349 (explaining that the recording of the conversation 
between the client and his attorney violated the Fourth Amendment and the Wiretapping Act 
because the parties had a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 16. See Mitchell, 421 F. Supp. at 891, 902.  In Mitchell, the prison had provided “inadequate 
facilities which [were] devoid of privacy” for attorney meetings and the hours were also very 
restricted for these meetings.  Id. at 891.  The court ordered the jail to provide normal visiting hours 
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Second, based on the Supreme Court’s application of the privilege to mail, 
lower courts require inmates and their lawyers to specifically mark 
communications to each other as “privileged.”17  Lower courts generally agree 
that prisons cannot open mail from an inmate’s attorney unless the inmate is 
present.18 
Third, with regard to phone calls, many prison phone systems do not record 
conversations with an attorney.19  Prisons often maintain lists of local attorneys, 
allowing inmates to add their attorney to the list so that calls with that attorney 
are not monitored.20  However, when a warning that the prison is monitoring the 
phone call is played, the call is not protected by the attorney-client privilege 
because the parties cannot reasonably expect privacy.21 
Recently, there have been two major changes to the attorney-client privilege 
in the context of inmates’ communications.  The first occurred after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.22  The attacks prompted the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons to change its guidelines to allow for the monitoring and review of 
certain communications between inmates and their attorneys.23  Under the new 
regulations, if the Attorney General certifies that there is “reasonable suspicion” 
that the communications are being used to facilitate terrorism, then the 
government may view the communications.24 
The second development centered on inmates’ use of e-mail to communicate 
with their attorneys.25  Outside of the inmate context, courts have found that e-
                                                        
for attorneys and a space for these meetings that could provide for a confidential conversation.  Id. 
at 902. 
 17. See, e.g., Stover v. Carlson, 413 F. Supp. 718, 721 (D. Conn. 1976) (“[A]ttorney-client 
mail is not treated as privileged unless it is specially stamped ‘attorney-client’ by the sender.”). 
 18. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974).  In Wolff, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged a state interest in ensuring that mail between an attorney and inmate did not contain 
contraband material, and upheld a statute allowing the mail to be opened and inspected with the 
inmate present.  Id. at 576–77; see also 3 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 12:26 
(4th ed. 2014) (noting that other lower courts have agreed with the Wolff court on the standard for 
confidentiality of attorney mail). 
 19. See, e.g., Korbe, 2010 WL 2776337, at *3 (analyzing a prison system that automatically 
excluded phone conversations with an attorney from monitoring). 
 20. United States v. Mitchell, No. 3:11-CR-248(S1)-J-34TEM, 2013 WL 3808152, at *10 
(M.D. Fla. July 22, 2013) (citing United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 100–01 (1st Cir. 2008)) 
(discussing the practice of having a list of all local attorneys to prevent recording phone calls 
between an inmate and attorney). 
 21. See United States v. Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d 820, 828–29 (E.D. Va. 2005). 
 22. Heidi Boghosian, Taint Teams and Firewalls: Thin Armor for Attorney-Client Privilege, 
1 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 15, 19–21 (2003).  See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2014); 66 Fed. 
Reg. 55,062, 55,063–64 (Oct. 31, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 500–01) (discussing the 
changes to § 501.3 with respect to the attorney-client privilege). 
 23. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3; see also 66 Fed. Reg. at 55,062–03. 
 24. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d). 
 25. Christopher Zoukis, Federal Bureau of Prisons Allows Inmates to Utilize Monitored 
Email Service, PRISON LAW BLOG (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.prisonlawblog.com/blog/federal-
bureau-of-prisons-allows-inmates-to-utilize-monitored-email-service#.VHC_govF9ig. 
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mail is protected by the attorney-client privilege because it carries a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.26  However, this same standard does not always apply 
for inmates because inmates are forced to waive their right to privacy when they 
use the prison e-mail system.27 
This Comment suggests that an e-mail between an inmate and his or her 
attorney should be treated as a privileged communication that is not discoverable 
by the government so long as it otherwise meets privilege requirements.  Part I 
surveys the historic origins of the attorney-client privilege, both inside and 
outside of the prison context.  Specifically, it addresses federal cases dealing 
with different forms of communication in prison, including in-person visits, 
letters, and phone calls.  Then, Part I also discusses the recent federal cases in 
which courts examined the use of e-mails in prisons.  In Part II, this Comment 
analyzes the different reasons that e-mails between an inmate and his or her 
attorney should be privileged, including constitutional protections and 
efficiency.  Finally, in Part III, this Comment suggests that the attorney-client 
privilege for inmate-attorney communications must adapt in order to apply the 
privilege to e-mails in the same way as traditional forms of communication. 
I.  A HISTORY OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
A.  The Oldest Privilege: The Attorney-Client Privilege 
As the oldest privilege, there is a vast amount of federal case law that tracks 
the development of the attorney-client privilege. 28   As the Supreme Court 
discussed in Upjohn Company v. United States,29 the “purpose [of the privilege] 
is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients 
and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and 
administration of justice.”30  The Supreme Court further observed that providing 
an attorney with all the facts allows that attorney to provide better legal advice 
                                                        
 26. See Curto v. Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327(DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL 
1318387, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006) (employing the Fourth Amendment privacy analysis to 
determine the existence of the attorney-client privilege in e-mail communications and finding that 
the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her e-mail communication).  See also Megan 
E. McEnroe, E-Mail in Attorney-Client Communications: A Survey of Significant Developments 
April 2009–June 2010, 66 BUS. LAW. 191, 192 (2010) (“The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia held that the party asserting the attorney-client privilege had shown an objectively 
reasonable, subjective expectation of privacy when an e-mail was transmitted.”). 
 27. See, e.g., United States v. Walia, No. 14-CR-213 (MKB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, 
at *50–51 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014) (noting that inmates’ use of TRULINCS prison e-mail system 
is conditioned on consent to monitoring); F.T.C. v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294-
CAP, 2012 WL 171621, at *7–8 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012) (finding that the defendant had waived 
the attorney-client privilege for e-mails sent through TRULINCS). 
 28. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 29. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
 30. Id. at 389. 
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to his client. 31   Later, in Trammel v. United States, 32  the Court further 
extrapolated that lawyers are better able to achieve their “professional mission” 
when they have all of the facts.33 
In Hunt v. Blackburn,34 the Supreme Court recognized that the privilege was 
necessary because legal assistance can only be provided when there was no 
“apprehension of disclosure.”35  In addition, the Court stated that this privilege 
belonged to the client, and once waived voluntarily by the client, could not be 
used to prevent the attorney from divulging information.36 
In determining the applicability of attorney-client privilege, the Supreme 
Court looks to “the nature of the privilege, its central purpose, the need for 
certainty as to the applicability of the privilege, and/or the costs that would be 
imposed if the privilege were held to apply to the situation at hand.”37  For the 
privilege to apply: 
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will 
not be disclosed.  (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential 
to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the 
parties.  (3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the 
community ought to be sedulously fostered.  (4) The injury that would 
inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication must be 
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of 
litigation.38 
The need for this privilege must be weighed against the competing need for the 
public to know the truth in an investigation.39 
Despite its importance to the proper function of the judicial system, the 
attorney-client privilege promotes “withholding relevant information from the 
fact-finder,” and, therefore, must be narrowly applied.40  As the Supreme Court 
discussed in Fisher v. United States,41 the privilege only covers information that 
is necessary for a client to obtain legal advice.42 
                                                        
 31. Id. 
 32. 445 U.S. 40 (1980). 
 33. Id. at 51 (“The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to 
know all that relates to the client’s reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is 
to be carried out.”); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (“The purpose of 
the privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.”). 
 34. 128 U.S. 464 (1888). 
 35. Id. at 470. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Brian Sheppard, Annotation, Views of United States Supreme Court as to Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 159 A.L.R. Fed. 243, 253 (2000). 
 38. Matthews, supra note 12, at 281 (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2285, at 527). 
 39. United States v. Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d 820, 826 (E.D. Va. 2005). 
 40. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). 
 41. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
 42. Id. at 403. 
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B.  The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Prison Context 
The attorney-client privilege is especially important when the client is an 
inmate.  Inmates do not have the same right to privacy that free individuals do.43  
To counteract their lack of individual freedom, inmates must be able to 
communicate with legal professionals.44  As a result, rules and practices that 
unnecessarily restrict an inmate’s access to his attorney violate his constitutional 
right to access effective counsel.45   Furthermore, not only do inmates need 
access to attorneys, but this access must also be free from intrusion by a third 
party.46 
Inmates have historically been able to communicate with their attorneys in-
person, via written letters, or on the phone.47  While federal courts prefer to 
abstain from adjudicating issues of prison administration, they have weighed in 
on cases dealing with attorney-client communications.48  As the Supreme Court 
discussed in Procunier v. Martinez,49 “courts are ill equipped to deal with the 
increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform,” but this 
“judicial restraint” cannot keep the Court from dealing with “valid constitutional 
claims.”50  For example, in Coplon v. United States,51 the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia addressed an inmate’s inability to have a private 
conversation and held that inmates had a constitutional right to have private 
conversations with an attorney.52 
1.  Attorney-Client In-Person Conversations in Prisons Are Generally 
Privileged 
Inmates have a constitutional right to speak to an attorney in private.53  For 
in-person conversations, inmates and their legal representatives may reasonably 
                                                        
 43. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525–26 (1984) (deciding that “society is not 
prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have 
in his prison cell”); Levenson, supra note 4, § 5:76 (noting that in a jail cell inmates are generally 
not entitled to privacy). 
 44. United States v. DeFonte, 441 F.3d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that inmates’ 
communications have the protection of the attorney-client privilege, despite their diminished 
expectation of privacy). 
 45. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 
U.S. 401, 413–14 (1989). 
 46. See supra note 5. 
 47. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 48. See Procunier, 416 U.S. at 404–05. 
 49. 416 U.S. 396 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413–14 (1989). 
 50. Id. at 405. 
 51. 191 F.2d 749 (1951). 
 52. Id. at 758–60. 
 53. See Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1052–53 (8th Cir. 1989) (explaining that 
only allowing inmates to consult with their attorneys in public areas risked the confidentiality of 
these communications and consequently violated the inmates’ right to “effective aid of counsel” 
(quoting Mastrian v. McManus, 554 F.2d 813, 820–21 (8th Cir. 1977)) (internal quotation marks 
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assume that their jail visiting room communications are private.54  In Black v. 
United States,55 the Supreme Court vacated a conviction because the state had 
recorded conversations between the defendant and his attorney.56  Courts have 
tied the attorney-client privilege to the Fourth Amendment’s privacy analysis, 
finding that the privilege applies to communications recorded by the prison for 
which the participants have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 57  
Consequently, private conversations between inmates and their attorneys, in 
which the inmates have a reasonable expectation of privacy, are protected by the 
attorney-client privilege. 58   Therefore, monitoring the private conversations 
violates the Fourth Amendment.59 
In addition to not monitoring these privileged conversations, prisons must 
provide a certain level of quality access to attorneys. 60   In Mitchell v. 
Untreiner, 61  the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida 
determined that the Escambia County Jail had such severe management 
problems that the court ordered specific remedies for the jail to implement.62  
The court required the jail to provide attorneys access to inmates on a daily basis, 
and to provide “adequate facilities” which could “insure the confidentiality of 
attorney-client communications.”63  The court also established that there was a 
minimum level of quality access that the jail must provide to attorneys 
representing inmates.64 
                                                        
omitted)); see also Negron v. Wallace, 436 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that “a detained 
juvenile has a constitutional right to consult with an attorney in privacy”). 
 54. See Gennusa v. Shoar, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2012); CARR & BELLIA, 
supra note 4, § 3:6. 
 55. 385 U.S. 26 (1966). 
 56. Id. at 27–29. 
 57. See, e.g., Gennusa, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1349 (finding the recording of plaintiffs’ 
conversations to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment since the plaintiffs had reasonably 
believed their conversations to be private); Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 F. Supp. 2d 419, 435 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006) (acknowledging that there is a reasonable “expectation of privacy in . . . attorney-client 
communications with [inmates]”). 
 58. See supra note 57. 
 59. See supra note 57. 
 60. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 902 (N.D. Fla. 1976). 
 61. 421 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Fla. 1976). 
 62. Id. at 897. 
 63. Id. at 902. 
 64. See id. (requiring the prison to provide “[a]ttorneys representing inmates in the Escambia 
County Jail [with] access to said inmates at any time within 12 hours of arrest,” and during “normal 
visiting hours”). 
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2.  Written Letters Between Attorneys and Inmates Are Privileged When the 
Parties Follow the Applicable Rules 
Attorneys and inmates also have a right to communicate through written 
letters.65  In Ex parte Hull,66 the Supreme Court established the concept of 
privileged mail in the context of confirming an inmate’s right to have access to 
the courts. 67   Thirty-three years later, the Supreme Court applied the First 
Amendment’s freedom of speech protection to inmate mail in Procunier v. 
Martinez.68  In Procunier, the Court said that inmate mail could only be censored 
if a prison had a policy that both furthered a governmental interest and was 
narrowly tailored to achieve only what was necessary.69 
Following Procunier, lower courts initiated programs requiring that mail from 
an attorney be clearly marked as such.70  For example, a prison may require that 
mail from an attorney contain specific markings indicating that it is privileged, 
as opposed to just including an attorney’s name and address as the return 
address.71  In Stover v. Carlson,72 the U.S. District Court for Connecticut limited 
such practices to instances where it was clear to both inmates and attorneys that 
a special marking was needed.73  Additionally, according to the U.S. District 
Court of Hawaii, in Samonte v. Manlinti, 74  requiring inmates to have their 
attorneys mark mail as confidential was an appropriate balance of the prison’s 
interest in security and an inmate’s right to communicate with his attorney.75 
                                                        
 65. See Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322 (D. N.H. 1977); see also Daniel M. 
Donovan, Jr., Constitutionality of Regulations Restricting Prisoner Correspondence with the 
Media, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1988) (observing that mail communications between 
attorneys and their clients are privileged and that the First Amendment protects the content of those 
communications from censorship). 
 66. 312 U.S. 546 (1941). 
 67. Id. at 548–49 (invalidating a regulation that authorized the warden to intercept inmates’ 
mail and deciding that “the state and its officers may not abridge or impair [an inmate’s] right to 
apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus” and the courts alone will determine the 
adequacy of such petitions). 
 68. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 
U.S. 401, 413–14 (1989). 
 69. Id. (holding that prison officials “must show that a regulation authorizing mail censorship 
furthers one or more of the substantial government interests of security, order, and rehabilitation”). 
 70. See, e.g., United States v. Stotts, 925 F.2d 83, 89–90 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that it was 
legal in North Carolina for a prison to require an attorney to specifically mark the confidential 
mail); Harrod v. Halford, 773 F.2d 234, 234 (8th Cir. 1985) (affirming the lower court’s decision 
to uphold a Nebraska mail policy that allowed the opening of mail away from the inmate if it had 
not been properly marked); Stover v. Carlson, 413 F. Supp. 718, 721 (D. Conn. 1976) (noting that 
the opening of mail from courts and members of Congress outside the inmates presence “chill[s]” 
the inmate’s right of access to the courts). 
 71. See Stover, 413 F. Supp. at 721–22 (finding that additional markings were required, absent 
a Bureau of Prisons regulation requiring additional markings). 
 72. 413 F. Supp. 718 (D. Conn. 1976). 
 73. Id. at 721–22. 
 74. No. 05-00598 SOM-BMK, 2007 WL 1963697 (D. Haw. July 3, 2007). 
 75. Id. at *8. 
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In addition to requiring inmates and their attorneys to mark privileged mail, 
the Supreme Court has said that prison employees can still open incoming mail 
in the presence of an inmate to ensure that there is no contraband in it. 76  
However, as addressed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in 
Bell-Bey v. Williams,77 the review of an inmates’ legal mail requires limitations 
and guidelines to restrict the discretion of prison officials.78  Without safeguards, 
“it could chill a prisoner’s free expression, communication with counsel, or 
access to the courts for fear his jailer reads the contents.”79  For outgoing mail 
designated as “special,” inmates may send it unopened.80  However, the prison 
may require inmates to supply the names of their attorneys in advance so that an 
attorney’s status, as legal counsel, can be verified.81 
3.  Phone Calls Between Attorneys and Inmates Are Privileged When There 
Is No Warning Message 
Phone calls between an inmate and an attorney have a different set of rules 
than in-person conversations and letters.  Phone calls between inmates and their 
attorneys are exempted from being recorded.82  In Coplon, the D.C. Circuit 
stated that an inmate and his attorney have a right to speak on the phone without 
being recorded by an unknown monitoring device.83  Further, according to the 
                                                        
 76. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974) (holding that opening inmates’ mail in 
their presences is an appropriate measure and does not constitute censorship because the inmates’ 
presence would prevent the prison employee from reading it).  See also Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 
997, 1014 (5th Cir. 1979) (“Outgoing mail to be licensed attorneys . . . must be sent unopened, and 
incoming mail from such sources may be opened only in the presence of the inmate recipient if 
considered necessary to determine authenticity or to inspect for contraband.  Prisoners may be 
required to submit the names of attorneys reasonably in advance of proposed mailings so that 
whether the named attorney is licensed may be ascertained.”); see also 3 MUSHLIN, supra note 18, 
§ 12:26. 
 77. 87 F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 78. Bell-Bey v. Williams, 87 F.3d 832, 839 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that a prison’s review of 
inmate’s mail did not violate an inmate’s constitutional right to communication with counsel 
because the prison had “implemented procedural safeguards” that “sufficiently collar the prison 
official’s review of the mail”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 1983); Jones, 594 F.2d at 1014.  For 
federal prisons, 28 C.F.R. § 540.18 addresses both incoming and outgoing mail and refers to 
privileged mail as “special mail.”  28 C.F.R. § 540.18 (2014).  The regulation states that privileged 
mail will be opened “only in the presence of the inmate for inspection for physical contraband and 
the qualification of any enclosures as special mail,” but not “read or copied if the sender is 
adequately identified on the envelope, and the front of the envelope is marked ‘Special Mail—Open 
only in the presence of the inmate.’”  Id. § 540.18(a).  It goes on to say that “outgoing special mail 
may be sealed by the inmate and is not subject to inspection.”  Id. § 540.18(c)(1).  Section 540.19 
also discusses procedures for “special mail.”  28 C.F.R. § 540.19. 
 81. Jones, 594 F.2d at 1014. 
 82. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
 83. Id. 
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court, the availability of alternative means of communication does not justify 
telephone call surveillance.84 
Federal regulations also prohibit prison staff from monitoring calls to 
attorneys.85  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed this issue 
in United States v. Novak,86 when a Massachusetts county jail recorded the 
phone calls between an inmate and his attorney.87  The jail posted signs warning 
that calls were monitored and also played a recording that stated the same 
warning at the beginning of calls.88  However, the prison, in an effort to comply 
with federal and state law prohibiting prisons from recording phone calls 
between attorneys and inmates, kept a list of attorneys and inmates could submit 
requests for additional names to be added to the list.89  The list allegedly included 
all local Massachusetts lawyers, but in this case it did not include the relevant 
attorney.90 
The Novak court found that two mistakes had been made in the course of the 
phone call monitoring.91  First, the relevant attorney’s number should have been 
included on the list.92  Second, once it became clear the calls were legal in nature, 
the prison staff should have stopped monitoring the calls.93 
However, courts have allowed phone calls between inmates and attorneys to 
be recorded when the prison provides a warning that the calls would be 
recorded.94  In United States v. Lentz,95 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia said that the parties could not have “reasonably expect[ed]” 
their conversation to be private because they had previously heard the recorded 
message alerting the participants that the prison recorded the calls.96  According 
to the court, as long as there are other means of communicating with an attorney, 
prisons can restrict attorney-client phone calls in this way.97 
                                                        
 84. Id. 
 85. 28 C.F.R. § 540.102. 
 86. 531 F.3d 99 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 87. Id. at 100–01.  Novak involved an attorney who had participated in illegal acts, but the 
court addressed the protections afforded to attorney-client calls.  Id. 
 88. Id. at 100. 
 89. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 540.102; 103 MASS. CODE REGS. § 482.09 (1994)). 
 90. Id. at 100–01. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 101. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See United States v. Mitchell, No. 3:11-CR-248(S1)-J-34TEM, 2013 WL 3808152, at *10 
(M.D. Fla. July 22, 2013) (finding that calls preceded by a warning that they will be monitored or 
recorded are not protected by the attorney-client privilege because one of the parties consented to 
the recording); United States v. Eye, No. 05-00344-01-CRW-ODS, 2008 WL 1701089, at *11 
(W.D. Mo. Apr. 9, 2008). 
 95. 419 F. Supp. 2d 820 (E.D. Va. 2005). 
 96. Id. at 828–29. 
 97. See, e.g., Stamper v. Campbell Cnty., Ky., No. 2007-49 (WOB), 2009 WL 2242410, at 
*2 (E.D. Ky. July 24, 2009). 
764 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:753 
C.  Recent Changes to the Attorney-Client Privilege 
1.  Developments in the Aftermath of the September 11, 2001 Terrorist 
Attacks to Reduce the Attorney-Client Privilege 
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
changed its guidelines to allow the Department of Justice (DOJ) to view 
communications between federal inmates and their attorneys.98  As part of these 
changes, the Attorney General must first show that there is a “reasonable 
suspicion” that the written or spoken conversation is facilitating an act of 
terrorism.99  Once the Attorney General has “reasonable suspicion,” the Director 
of the Bureau of Prisons may view and listen to communications that the 
attorney-client privilege has historically protected.100 
These changes have altered the traditional contours of the attorney-client 
privilege, 101  potentially chilling attorney-client communications, which is a 
result that courts have tried to prevent.102  Now, clients and attorneys may feel 
unable to share information and speak freely, hindering “an inmate’s Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.” 103   In Al-Owhali v. 
Ashcroft, 104  the defendant unsuccessfully argued that even though this 
regulation had not been used against him yet, it was having a “chilling effect” 
on his communications.105 
However, the regulation does attempt to provide checks on the government’s 
new power.  The Director of the Bureau of Prisons must give notice to both the 
inmate and his attorney before beginning to monitor any conversations.106  In 
addition, the officials monitoring the calls must not be involved in the inmate’s 
prosecution. 107   Additionally, except in extraordinary circumstances, if the 
                                                        
 98. See Boghosian, supra note 22, at 15. 
 99. Id. at 19–20; see also 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2014); Prevention of Acts of Violence and 
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,062, 55,063 (Oct. 31, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 500–01) 
(discussing the changes to 28 C.F.R. § 501.3). 
 100. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2007).  The guidelines do not explain what reasonable suspicion is, 
but the Supreme Court has said that it involves more than an unspecified suspicion, but less than 
the level of suspicion required for probable cause.  See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 
(1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 101. See Cole, supra note 1, at 548–52 (discussing the change in 2001 and the criticisms of the 
regulation as an unconstitutional interference with an inmate’s right of access to counsel); Sharon 
Jaffrey, An Act of Patriotism? Infringing on the Individual’s Sixth Amendment Right to Effective 
Counsel, 33 SW. U. L. REV. 165, 166–67 (2004). 
 102. Boghosian, supra note 22, at 20–21. 
 103. Jaffrey, supra note 101, at 166–67. 
 104. 279 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 105. Id. at 22, 29 (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing a facial challenge to 
monitoring regulation for lack of standing because the “chilling effect” was too “remote and 
uncertain”). 
 106. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(2) (2014).  See Cole, supra note 1, at 549. 
 107. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(3).  See Cole, supra note 1, at 549. 
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government seeks to use material that was obtained from the monitoring, a 
federal judge must approve its use.108 
2.  Changes in the Forms of Communication: The Rise of E-mail 
Technology and the ways in which people communicate with each other are 
constantly changing.109  The clearest example of this phenomenon has been the 
rise of e-mail, which offers a level of speed and efficiency not previously 
available.110  E-mail’s increasing use among legal counsel is in part due to the 
fact that it does not require another person’s availability, it provides a written 
version of a conversation, and it can be saved and easily accessed later.111 
a.  Attorney-Client E-mails Outside of the Prison Context 
For the general attorney-client privilege, when not involving inmates, courts 
have found that parties can have a reasonable expectation of privacy when using 
e-mail, except in the context of workplace e-mail accounts.112  However, in 
Convertino v. U.S. Department of Justice,113  the court found that the defendant 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal e-mails from a work account 
and that, consequently, those e-mails were protected by the attorney-client 
privilege.114  Courts determining the applicability of the attorney-client privilege 
to e-mail often employ traditional tests used for other forms of communications, 
including looking at whether legal advice was being conveyed and whether there 
was an expectation of privacy.115 
                                                        
 108. See supra note 107. 
 109. See Piekarski, supra note 8, at 771. 
 110. Crotty, supra note 8 (discussing the increasing use of e-mail in legal contexts). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Governor Mifflin Sch. Dist., No. 11-1278, 2012 WL 2501017, 
at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2012) (explaining that because the plaintiff’s e-mail was not personal in 
any manner, such as a personal e-mail account, and was instead on a work computer, her 
expectation of privacy was unreasonable); Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 
587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining that the plaintiff-employer’s monitoring of 
the defendant’s e-mails sent from the employer’s computers was distinguishable from workplace 
e-mail cases because the defendant had used a personal e-mail account and therefore had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy); see also United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285–86 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (finding that e-mails should be afforded the same protection as other forms of 
communication). 
 113. 674 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d on other ground, 684 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 114. Id. at 110 (finding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails 
sent form a work account because he was “unaware that [the employer] would be regularly 
accessing and saving e-mails sent from his account”). 
 115. See, e.g., Owens v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., No. 7:12-CV-144(HL), 2013 WL 6389035, at 
*2 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 6, 2013) (holding that e-mails with a lawyer recipient were not automatically 
privileged because they did not discuss legal advice). 
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b.  Attorney-Client E-mails Sent Using Monitored Work E-mail Accounts 
Are Not Protected 
Courts have generally found that e-mails sent on monitored workplace 
computers do not carry a reasonable expectation of privacy.116  In determining 
if certain e-mails are protected, courts often focus on whether the employees 
could reasonably have thought their communications were private, taking into 
account whether there was an employment policy that provided that the 
employer could monitor e-mails.117  For example, in Hanson v. First National 
Bank,118 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia found 
that, because an employer had a policy stating that the employer could monitor 
e-mail sent on a work e-mail system, the employee did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in e-mails sent from work.119 
c.  A New Conversation: A Trend Toward Not Protecting E-mails Between 
Inmates and Their Attorneys 
The debate over the protection of e-mails between inmates and their attorneys 
is only recently starting to appear in court cases.120  This Comment focuses on 
federal cases because federal inmates have access to e-mail via the Trust Fund 
Limited Inmate Computer System (TRULINCS).121  States have been slower to 
adopt this policy, with many still not giving inmates access to e-mail or the 
Internet.122 
Among federal courts that have heard the issue, there is a consensus that 
because TRULINCS informs inmates that e-mails are monitored, there is no 
                                                        
 116. See Dombrowski, 2012 WL 2501017, at *7. 
 117. Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank, No. CIV.A. 5:10-0906, 2011 WL 5201430, at *5 (S.D.W. Va. 
Oct. 31, 2011) (explaining that by using a work computer, an employee may have “impliedly 
waived confidentiality of the communication afforded by the attorney-client privilege if the 
employer has a policy which eliminates any expectation of privacy . . . by prohibiting personal use 
of the employer’s computer system and establishing that the employer has ownership of e-mails 
and the right to monitor them”). 
 118. No. CIV.A. 5:10-0906, 2011 WL 5201430 (S.D.W. Va. Oct. 31, 2011). 
 119. Id., at *6. 
 120. Clifford, supra note 7. 
 121. 3 MUSHLIN, supra note 18, § 14:15 (quoting Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748, 755 (5th 
Cir. 1978)). 
 122. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF CORR. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, HANDBOOK FOR THE 
FAMILIES AND FRIENDS OF NEW YORK STATE DOCCS OFFENDERS 38 (2013), available at 
http://www.doccs.ny.gov/FamilyGuide/FamilyHandbook.pdf (explaining that New York offenders 
do not have access to e-mail); Frequently Asked Questions, OHIO DEP’T REHAB. & CORR., 
http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/faq.htm (last updated Nov. 25, 2014) (stating that Ohio inmates do 
not have access to e-mail); How to Contact an Inmate, CAL. DEP’T CORR. & REHAB., 
http://cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/howtocontact.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) (stating that 
one can only contact California state inmates by mail or phone calls); but see Kimberly Railey, 
Some Prisons Let Inmates Connect With Tablets, USA TODAY (Aug. 18, 2013, 3:40 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/08/17/tabletsforinmates/2651727/. 
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expectation of privacy and, therefore, the e-mails are not privileged.123  In F.T.C 
v. National Urological Group, Inc.,124 the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia found that the defendants had waived their attorney-client 
privilege by e-mailing with their attorneys because the inmates had consented to 
the monitoring of their e-mail communications.125 
However, more recently, there has been a trend toward defendants conceding 
that their e-mails are not privileged, and, instead, arguing that the monitoring of 
their e-mails violates their constitutional right to access counsel.126  In United 
States v. Walia, 127  the defendant acknowledged that his e-mails with his 
attorney, sent on the prison e-mail system, were not privileged, but argued they 
should not be viewable by the government because government review would 
“frustrate[] his right to access counsel.”128  Further, the defendant’s attorney 
asserted that e-mail was a more efficient means of contacting his client, allowing 
him to “explain matters to his client so that his client [could] make informed 
decisions.”129 
Despite the ease and speed of attorney-client e-mail communications, in 
Walia, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the 
prison e-mail system was not privileged and that the inmate’s right of access to 
counsel was not violated because he had other ways of communicating with his 
lawyer.130  In addressing the constitutional question, the court acknowledged 
that these additional forms of communications may be more “burdensome,” but 
that this was not a sufficient reason to find that the prison had violated the 
defendant’s constitutional right to have access to counsel.131 
                                                        
 123. See United States v. Walia, No. 14-CR-213 (MKB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at 
*47 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014); United States v. Asaro, No. 14-Cr-26 (ARR), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
97396, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2014); F.T.C. v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294-
CAP, 2012 WL 171621, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012); see also supra note 7 and accompanying 
text. 
 124. No. 1:04-CV-3294-CAP, 2012 WL 171621 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012). 
 125. Id. at *6 (holding that the defendant had waived attorney-client privilege “because he had 
consented to monitoring and thus had no reasonable expectation of privacy”). 
 126. See, e.g., Walia, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *47. 
 127. No. 14-CR-213 (MKB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014). 
 128. Id. at *47 (quoting Docket Entry No. 34 at 1) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(explaining that the defendant’s counsel argued that using e-mail “allows him to meet his ethical 
obligations under the American Bar Association’s Model Rule 1.4” and “‘allows busy public 
defenders to tend to all of their clients’” (quoting Docket Entry No. 34 at 2–3)). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at *48–50 (“‘TRULINCS . . . is a privilege and the BOP has absolute discretion in 
determining whether to limit or deny the use of TRULINCS by an inmate’” (quoting Dunlea v. Fed. 
Bureau of Prisons, No. 3:10-cv-214 (CFD), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41134, at *3 (D. Conn. Apr. 
26, 2010))). 
 131. Id. at *49–50 (holding that although the defendant’s counsel recommended a 
technological solution, which involved each inmate having two e-mail addresses to allow for e-
mails with attorneys to automatically be separated, as of now the TRULINCS e-mail system “does 
not provide for the communication of privileged information”). 
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Another recent case with similar arguments is United States v. Asaro.132  In 
Asaro, the defendant argued that although his e-mails were not privileged, the 
government reading his e-mails frustrates his Sixth Amendment right of access 
to counsel because avoiding this official surveillance through using traditionally 
protected communications, such as in-person conferences, would not be as 
efficient as communicating with his attorney via e-mail.133  The U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York found that this did not violate the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights because he had other forms of privileged 
communication with his attorney.134  The court went on to say that, “it would be 
a welcome development for . . . [the Bureau of Prisons] to improve TRULINCS 
so that attorney-client communications could be easily separated from other e-
mails and subject to protection.  However, . . . any inconvenience . . . does not 
rise to the level of a Sixth Amendment violation.”135 
The U.S. Attorney’s office for the Eastern District of New York, which 
prosecuted both Walia and Asaro,136 proactively asserts a lack of privilege to 
inmate’s e-mails.137  On June 9, 2014, the U.S. Attorney’s Office released a letter 
explaining that the office would be monitoring e-mails between inmates and 
their attorneys sent on TRULINCS because the e-mails are not privileged.138  
The letter included several ways in which inmates and attorneys are warned that 
                                                        
 132. No. 14-Cr-26 (ARR), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2014). 
 133. Id. at *2–3.  The defense attorney in the ongoing case of United States v. Syed Imran 
Ahmed raised a similar argument in a letter to the judge, arguing that the defendant’s e-mails should 
be protected in order to preserve the defendant’s right of access to counsel.  Letter from Morris J. 
Fodeman to Judge Dora L. Irizarry 1–2 (June 20, 2014), available at http://www.kmbllaw.com/ 
documents/CorrlinksPrivilegeClaimLetter.pdf.  Morris J. Fodeman, the attorney, explained the 
difficulties involved in attempting to contact the defendant.  Id. at 2–3.  The prison does not accept 
mail sent “via expedited mail services,” resulting in a wait time of two or more weeks for an inmate 
to receive a letter.  Id. at 2.  This process does not include the time it then takes for the inmate to 
respond and to get a letter back to his attorneys.  Id. at 2–3.  As for phone calls, defense attorneys 
often have to spend an extended amount of time attempting to get their calls pre-approved.  Id.  
Visiting the defendant in prison can take a total of five hours, which costs the taxpayers $600 for 
the visit alone, because the defense attorney is paid by the taxpayers.  Id. 
 134. Asaro, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at *3–4 (holding that the prison’s system did not 
“‘unreasonably interfere’” with the defendant’s access to counsel and that the defendant did not 
assert “any interference with his ability to consult counsel through these other media, other than his 
counsel’s expending time and funds on traveling to visit him and the inconvenience of having to 
arrange phone calls in advance”). 
 135. Id. at *4. 
 136. See Walia, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *1; Asaro, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, 
at *1. 
 137. See Letter from James G. McGovern, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Chief, Criminal Division, 
E. Dist. of N.Y., to Peter Kirchheimer, Attorney-in-Charge, Federal Defenders of N.Y. (June 9, 
2014), available at http://nylawyer.nylj.com/adgifs/decisions14/072214letter.pdf. 
 138. Id. (noting initial user agreements, warnings when users logged in, and notifications to 
users of the TRULINCS system). 
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the prisons monitor e-mails.139  First, inmates consent to monitoring in order to 
gain access to TRULINCS.140  Second, non-inmate users are also warned that 
the prisons monitor all communications.141  Third, every time inmates log onto 
TRULINCS they are again warned that the prison monitors e-mails, and inmates 
must click “I accept,” acknowledging their consent to the monitoring.142 
Other federal courts have not been as accepting of the government 
surveillance of e-mails between inmates and attorneys.  For example, in United 
States v. Aguilar,143 the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California 
suggested that e-mails between an inmate and her attorney were protected.144  
Aguilar involved an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) who had accessed 
e-mails between an inmate and her attorneys and shared them with the 
prosecution.145  The AUSA claimed she had the court’s permission to do so.146  
Ultimately, the court suppressed the e-mails, finding that the AUSA was not 
authorized to monitor or share the communications.147  The Aguilar decision 
suggests that the Central District of California affords inmates’ e-mails more 
protection than the Eastern District of New York. 
II.  DIFFERENT MOTIVATIONS FOR MAKING E-MAILS BETWEEN INMATES AND 
ATTORNEYS PRIVILEGED 
The cases concerning e-mails between inmates and their attorneys have 
featured different legal arguments to support e-mail’s protection from 
surveillance, including the attorney-client privilege, the constitutional right to 
access counsel, and efficiency.  Although not used in recent e-mail cases, the 
constitutional right of freedom of speech, 148  the right to petition the 
                                                        
 139. Id. (stating that user agreements inform TRULINCS users that they are “notified of, 
acknowledge and voluntarily consent to having [their] messages and transaction data . . . monitored, 
read, retained by Bureau staff and otherwise handled” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (C.D. Ca. 2011). 
 144. Id. at 1193–94 (observing that “the [c]ourt granted Aguilar’s motion to suppress” the 
prosecution’s improper use of “communications between Aguilar and her attorneys”). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1194. 
 147. Id. (concluding and admitting that “[t]he prosecutors never requested [the] court[’s] 
permission to obtain [the e-mails]”). 
 148. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 
490 U.S. 401, 413–14 (1989) (holding that censorship of inmate mail is acceptable when there is a 
“substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression” and “the limitation 
of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of 
the particular governmental interest involved”); Bell-Bey v. Williams, 87 F.3d 832, 839 (6th Cir. 
1996) (explaining that a policy directing prison officials to read attorney-client mail would “chill a 
prisoner’s free expression”). 
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government,149 and the right to due process150 have also been used in cases 
dealing with attorney-client privilege and its attendant privacy interest generally. 
A.  The Attorney-Client Privilege 
The first defense for preventing the government from looking at inmate-
attorney e-mails is the attorney-client privilege.151  However, this argument has 
not been successful. For example, in F.T.C. v. National Urological Group, 
Inc.,152 the court addressed the question of attorney-client privilege and found 
that the defendants had waived their attorney-client privilege.153  The court held 
that the privilege was waived because the inmate used TRULINCS, which 
notified him that his e-mails would be monitored.154  In more recent cases, 
parties have conceded this argument, and instead proceeded to the constitutional 
claim of access to counsel.155 
The courts’ analysis for attorney-client privilege in e-mails is similar to the 
analysis for phone calls.  In United States v. Lentz, the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia found that phone calls were not privileged when 
parties were alerted that their calls were being recorded because they could not 
have had a reasonable expectation of privacy.156  Therefore, the courts seem to 
agree that when an inmate is put on notice that a phone call or e-mail is being 
monitored, the attorney-client privilege does not apply. 
B.  A Constitutional Right to Access Counsel 
Parties have now started to concede the attorney-client privilege argument, 
and instead focus on the constitutional argument of the right to counsel.157  This 
                                                        
 149. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 
(1969)) (“[P]risoners have the constitutional right to petition the Government for redress of their 
grievances, which includes a reasonable right of access to the courts.”). 
 150. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1951)  (citing Neufield v. United 
States, 118 F.2d 375, 383 (D.C. Cir.)) (explaining that due process involves an inmate having 
“effective and substantial aid of counsel”).  The court went on to say that a person accused of a 
crime could not have “effective aid of counsel” if he could not converse privately with the attorney.  
Id. 
 151. F.T.C. v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294-CAP, 2012 WL 171621, at *5 
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012). 
 152. No. 1:04-CV-3294-CAP, 2012 WL 171621, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012). 
 153. Id. at *5–6. 
 154. Id. 
 155. United States v. Asaro, No. 14-Cr-26 (ARR), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, *1–2 
(E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2014). 
 156. United States v. Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d 820, 828–29 (E.D. Va. 2005). 
 157. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Asaro, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at *1–2. 
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argument was used to no avail in United States v. Asaro, F.T.C. v. National 
Urological Group, Inc., and United States v. Walia.158 
In Asaro, the argument did not work because the court found that a lack of 
access to privileged e-mails did not deprive the defendant of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel because there are a myriad of alternative means of 
communicating with his attorney.159  The court noted that instead of restricting 
inmates’ ability to communicate with their attorneys, the prison actually 
improved inmates’ access to the outside world and counsel by allowing inmates 
to use TRULINCS.160 
In F.T.C., the court rejected this same argument for two reasons.161  First, the 
court found that the prison had not violated the defendant’s constitutional rights 
because he consented to the monitoring of his e-mails and, therefore, had no 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”162  Second, the court found that because it 
was a civil contempt proceeding, the Sixth Amendment did not apply.163 
In Walia, the court did not find the defendant’s right to counsel argument 
persuasive for similar reasons as those in Asaro.164  The court stated that the 
defendant was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because he 
had additional ways of communicating with his attorney.165  Specifically, the 
court found that although it “may not agree with the position of the United States 
Attorney’s Office to review non-privileged e[-]mail communications between 
inmates and their attorneys communicated over a monitored system, the [c]ourt 
has no legal basis to find that the fundamental right of access to effective 
assistance of counsel . . . is compromised.”166 
Parties have made similar arguments in cases dealing with phone calls 
between inmates and their attorneys. 167   In Coplon, the court stressed the 
importance of allowing an inmate to “privately . . . consult with counsel.”168  The 
court reasoned that even if the inmate had other ways to communicate with his 
attorney, because the right of access to counsel is important, phone calls should 
still not be intercepted.169 
                                                        
 158. United States v. Walia, No. 14–CR–213 (MKB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *47–
51 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014); Asaro, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at *1–4; F.T.C., 2012 WL 
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 159. Asaro, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at *3–4 
 160. Id. at *4. 
 161. F.T.C., 2012 WL 171621, at *5–8. 
 162. Id. at *6. 
 163. Id. 
 164. United States v. Walia, No. 14-CR-213 (MKB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *49–
51 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014).  See Asaro, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at *3–4. 
 165. Walia, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *49–50. 
 166. Id. at *50. 
 167. See Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
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C.  The Efficiency of E-mail 
Beyond the legal arguments for protecting attorney-client e-mails, there are 
practical reasons to do so as well.  Attorneys have argued that e-mails are a more 
efficient means of communication with their incarcerated clients.170  As the court 
admitted in Asaro, it is not only “easier but also more efficient and cost-effective 
if their communications regarding defense preparation could be conducted 
through privilege-protected emails.”171  This is especially important when the 
public, and not a private client, is paying for legal services.172 
The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ website outlines the several steps involved in 
visiting an inmate.173  The visits can take hours between driving to and from the 
prison, going through security, and actually conducting the visit.174  While phone 
calls can be an easy form of communication for those on the outside, a phone 
call to an inmate can also be extremely time consuming because it requires 
getting approval for an un-monitored call.175  And while letters themselves may 
not take much time to write, the time it takes for them to get to the inmate, and 
then to get back to the attorney, can sometimes run up to several weeks.176 
Attorneys in both Asaro and Walia relied on the efficiency argument to 
support their claim that the government should not be reading the defendants’ e-
mails to their attorneys.177  However, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York was not persuaded by this argument in either case.178  The 
court in Asaro said that although it understood that it would be “more efficient 
and cost-effective if their communications regarding defense preparation could 
be conducted through privilege-protected e-mails, there is insufficient legal basis 
for the argument that [the Bureau of Prisons’] failure to provide a privileged 
                                                        
 170. See United States v. Asaro, No. 14-Cr-26 (ARR), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at *3 
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at *3–4. 
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form of email communication infringes . . . [the] right to counsel.”179  The court 
in Walia took a similar approach, stating that, “[a]lthough the [c]ourt 
understands and appreciates [the] [d]efendant’s desire to have quick and easy 
access to his counsel by e-mail,” there was “no legal basis” to conclude that an 
inability to e-mail with one’s attorney violates the Sixth Amendment’s right of 
access to counsel.180 
III.  A MODERN SOLUTION FOR AN OLD CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
The attorney-client privilege has been recognized in the American legal 
system longer than any other privilege.181  It is a vital part of a defendant’s ability 
to receive effective legal counsel and fair access to the courts.182  The privilege 
was previously extended to three common forms of communication—in-person 
visits, letters, and phone calls.183  And yet, as technology has changed and a new 
form of communication, e-mail, has become part of society, the law has not 
adapted accordingly. 
E-mail has integrated itself into every other facet of American culture and 
life.184  Prisons took a positive step forward by granting inmates access to e-
mail.185  However, they need to take the next step by treating attorney-client e-
mails, sent on TRULINCS, in the same manner as other forms of privileged 
communication that inmates can access. 
This issue is new to federal courts.  Of the courts faced with this question, 
several have said that they are forced to find that these e-mails are not privileged, 
and, therefore, prosecutors and prison officials can access the e-mails.186  Even 
though courts were sympathetic to the inmates’ arguments in these cases, it ruled 
against them, citing current privilege doctrine and alternate means of 
communication, which prevent a lack of confidential e-mail from rising to the 
level of a Sixth Amendment violation.187 
The current approach is based on the assumption that the e-mails are not 
privileged because inmates consent to e-mail monitoring when they log on to 
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TRULINCS.188  However, the same argument could be made for phone calls that 
are monitored.189  Yet, with phone calls, courts have held that while officials 
may monitor them generally, phone calls between attorneys and inmates are 
privileged and protected by the Sixth Amendment and therefore may not be 
monitored if inmates follow certain rules.190  This rule should apply to e-mails 
as well.  Prisons should generally monitor e-mails, but with an exception for 
attorney-client e-mails, so that there is no warning for those conversations.  This 
would provide a reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus, a privilege. 
Although e-mail should be treated as privileged, there is also a strong 
argument that e-mail should not be discoverable by the government because it 
infringes on an inmate’s right to access counsel.191  The same constitutional 
impetus—which requires prisons to allow inmates to communicate with their 
attorneys via in-person visits, phone calls, and letters—should apply to e-mail.  
However, courts argue that there are sufficient alternative forms of 
communication.192  This argument is flawed for two reasons.  First, it is arbitrary 
to say that three forms of communication are enough and four would be too 
many.  Second, the fourth form is more efficient and effective than the previous 
three. 
E-mail is efficient.193  It allows an attorney to communicate more easily with 
his client about a time sensitive matter and receive a timely response.  In cases 
with complicated documents, this efficiency is necessary for the attorney to 
effectively represent the client.194  It also allows an attorney, especially a public 
defender, to do all of this from home or work, as opposed to spending hours 
getting to and from the prison, hours attempting to get phone call approval, or 
weeks waiting for letters to make it to and from the prison.195 
The solution to this problem is to treat e-mail communications between 
inmates and their attorneys as privileged, in the same way that the other forms 
of communication are already treated as privileged.  Arguably, there are many 
ways to do this, but the best is to treat inmate e-mails in the same manner as 
                                                        
 188. Walia, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102246, at *49–50. 
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phone calls.  E-mails are most similar to phone calls because nothing physical 
can be passed back and forth, as can be done with a visit or a letter.  Therefore, 
the prison cannot justify e-mail monitoring on the basis of uncovering 
contraband.  However, while phone calls may be monitored,196 the federal rules 
provide for the protection of properly placed phone calls between attorneys and 
clients.197  The e-mail rules should follow the federal phone call rules that protect 
the attorney-client privilege. 
In coming up with a solution that treats e-mails like phone calls, the first step 
is to eliminate the warning that is included in the TRULINCS system.  Currently, 
inmates are warned that the prison monitors all conversations.198  TRULINCS 
needs to be updated so that e-mails between inmates and their attorneys are not 
monitored.  If prisons are not able to change the message on TRULINCS, there 
needs to be a prison wide policy that filters e-mails between inmates and 
attorneys out of the general pool to prevent the government from monitoring 
them. 
Additionally, the prisons need to require inmates and their attorneys to ensure 
that the e-mail addresses of the attorneys are on the prison’s list of e-mails not 
to monitor.  This approach is similar to the phone call and letter systems already 
in place.199  It would be impossible for a prison to have a list of every local 
attorney’s email address.  There are always new attorneys, and people tend to 
change their e-mail addresses more frequently than people historically did with 
phone numbers.  Therefore, the burden should rightfully be placed on inmates 
and their attorneys to update the prison list with the e-mail addresses of the 
attorneys in order to ensure their communications are protected. 
As with the other forms of communication, cases where an inmate does not 
follow the rules to ensure the inmate has privileged conversations can result in 
a waiver of the inmate’s right to a privileged conversation.200  However, for this 
to be appropriate, prisons must ensure that all requirements and systems are 
adequately explained and advertised to both inmates and their attorneys. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The attorney-client privilege is an integral part of an individual’s right to due 
process, counsel, free speech, and to petition.  As such an important privilege, it 
is crucial, especially in the setting of prisons, that the law adapts to changes in 
technology.  One technology that has revolutionized the way legal representation 
is conducted is e-mail communication.  However, the law and the prison system 
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have not adapted to allow inmates to have privileged communications via e-mail.  
The law needs to be changed so that e-mails are given the same privileged 
treatment as in-person visits, letters, and phone calls.  This change should be 
achieved by changing the language on TRULINCS, the inmates’ e-mail access 
system, so that the parties can enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy, which, 
in turn, will allow the courts to prevent the government from monitoring the e-
mails between inmates and pre-approved attorneys. 
 
 
